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We call such problems, contract choice problems. The main result of this paper states 
that every contract choice problem has a non-empty weak bargaining set. The need for  
such a solution concept which is considerably weaker than the core arises, since it is 
well known that even for very simple contract choice problems, the core may be empty. 
We also show by means of an example that the bargaining set due to Mas-Colell (1989), 
as well as a weaker version of it, may be empty for contract choice problems, thereby 
implying that the weakening we suggest is in some ways “tight” 
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Abstract 
In this paper, we consider the problem of choosing a set of multi-party contracts, 
where each coalition of agents has a non-empty finite set of feasible contracts to 
choose from. We call such problems, contract choice problems. The main result 
of this paper states that every contract choice problem has a non-empty weak 
bargaining set. The need for a such a solution concept which is considerably 
weaker than the core arises, since it is well known that even for very simple 
contract choice problems, the core may be empty. We also show by means of an 
example that the bargaining set due to Mas-Colell (1989), as well as a weaker 
version of it, may be empty for contract choice problems, thereby implying that 
the weakening we suggest is in some ways “tight”. 
 
1. Introduction:  
 
In this paper, we consider the problem of choosing a set of multi-party contracts, 
where each coalition of agents has a non-empty finite set of feasible contracts to 
choose from. We call such problems, contract choice problems. The economic 
motivation behind the problem, arises from several real world "commons 
problems", where agents can pool their initial resources and produce a marketable 
surplus, which needs to be shared among themselves. There are clearly, two 
distinct problems that arise out of such real world possibilities: (i) Coalition 
Formation: Which are the disjoint coalitions that will form in order to pool in their 
resources? (ii) Distribution: How will a coalition distribute the surplus within 
itself? While, the possibility of an aggregate amount of surplus being generated 
by a coalition is fairly common, there are many situations where more than one 
aggregate surplus results from a cooperative activity, and the distribution of the 
surplus depends on the particular aggregate that a coalition chooses to share.  
In our model, which has been developed in a related paper [Lahiri (2003)] each 
non-empty subset of agents has a non-empty finite set of pay-off vectors to 
choose from. An outcome comprises a partition of the set of agents, and an 
assignment for each coalition in the partition a feasible pay-off vector. Our model 
is therefore a special kind of cooperative game with non-transferable utility. In the   2
context of our contract choice model, the Shapley-Scarf (1974) housing market 
corresponds to a situation, where each individual assigns a monetary worth to 
each object, and a feasible pay-off vector for a coalition, is the set of utility 
vectors available to the coalition, when it re-allocates objects within itself, 
without any one in the coalition retaining his initial endowment, unless the 
coalition is a singleton. Lahiri (2004) proves the existence and Weak Pareto 
Optimality of 'stable' outcomes in a two-sided contract choice problem. The 
model studied in Lahiri (2004) is originally due to Roth and Sotomayor (1996).    
Zhou (1994) introduced a concept of the bargaining set, which is a slight variation 
of the original one due to Aumann and Maschler (1964). Yet another notion of a 
bargaining set is due to Mas-Colell (1989). The Zhou(1994) bargaining set of a 
marriage problem always contains its non-empty core. Klijn and Masso(2003) 
introduced the concept of the weakly stable set for a marriage problem and 
showed that the set of efficient and weakly stable matchings coincided with its 
bargaining set as defined by Zhou (1994).  
We introduce the concepts of the weak bargaining set for contract choice 
problems. The basic idea behind the weak bargaining set is a set of feasible 
allocations, which do not admit a credible objection (i.e. every strong objection 
has a strong counter-objection). Our definition of a credible objection is 
somewhat different from that of Zhou (1994) or Mas-Colell (1989), in that we 
require a strong counter-objection to make none of its proponents worse off than 
what they were at the time when the objection was raised. We further require that 
no sub-coalition of an objecting coalition can block the objecting pay-off.  
The main result of this paper states that every contract choice problem has a non-
empty weak bargaining set. We show with the help of a three-agent example, that 
a natural analog of the bargaining set due to Mas-Colell (1989), and hence the 
bargaining set due to Mas-Colell (1989), may well be empty for room-mates 
problems. This, in particular suggest that the weakening of the bargaining set we 
suggest here, is indeed “tight”. 
 
2. Contract Choice Problems: 
  
Let X be a non-empty finite subset of ℵ(: the set of natural numbers), denoting 
the set of participating agents. Let ℜ denote the set of all real numbers and ℜ+ the 
set of non-negative real numbers. Let [X] denote the set of all non-empty subsets 
of X. Members of [X] are called coalitions. Further let ℜ
S denote the set of all 
functions from S to ℜ and [ℜ
S] denote the collection of all non-empty finite 
subsets of ℜ
S. Given S∈[X], let #S denote the number of elements of S. 
Given S∈[X], let C(S) = {µ/ µ is a bijection on X with µ(S) = S} and C
0(S) = 
{µ∈C(S)/ T is a non-empty proper subset of S implies µ(T) ≠T}. 
Thus, if #S ≥ 2, then the function µ: X→ X, such that µ(a) = a for all a∈S, 
belongs to C(S)\ C
0(S). 
A Contract Choice Problem (CCP) is a function G: [X]→( )∪{φ} such 
that for all S∈[X]: (i) G(S) ⊂ ℜ
U




S; (ii) G({a}) = {0} for all a∈X. 
G(S) is the set of all feasible allocations of pay-offs for agents in S.    3
Given a CCP G, a coalition structure for G is a partition of X. 
A pay-off function is a function v : X → ℜ+. If v is a pay-off function and S∈[X], 
then v|S denotes the restriction of v to the set S.  
An outcome for a CCP G is a pair (f, v), where f is a coalition structure for G and 
v is a pay-off function such that (i) for all a∈X: v(a) ≥ 0; (ii) for all S∈f: v|S∈ 
G(S). 
The pair (f, v), where f = {{a}/ a∈X} and v(a) = 0 for all a∈X, is an outcome for 
every CCP. Hence the set of outcomes is always non-empty. 
 
Given an outcome (f, v) for a CCP G, a coalition S∈[X] is said to block (f, v) if 
there exists x ∈ G(S): x(a) > v(a) for all a∈S.  
An outcome (f, v) for a CCP G is said to belong to the core of 
G, if it does not admit any blocking coalition. Let Core(G) denote the set of 
outcomes in the core of G. 
An outcome (f, v) for a CCP G is said to be Weakly Pareto Optimal if it does not 
admit X as a blocking coalition. 
 
Given a CCP G, an outcome (f, v) is said to be weakly blocked by a coalition 
T∈[X], if there exists x∈G(T): x(a) ≥ v(a) for all a∈T, with strict inequality for at 
least one a∈T. If an outcome (f,v) is weakly blocked by a coalition T∈[X], via 
x∈G(T), then a∈T is said to be an active member of the weakly blocking coalition 
T, if x(a) > v(a). 
An outcome (f,v) is said to be Pareto Optimal if it does not admit X as a weakly 
blocking coalition. 
 
A special case of a CCP is the room-mates problem of Gale and Shapley (1962), 
where G(S) = φ, whenever #S > 2. The marriage problem of Gale and Shapley 
(1962) is in turn a special case of their room-mates problem. If G(S) = φ, 
whenever #S > 3, then we have a possible generalization of the man, woman and 
child problem of Alkan (1988).  
The following example due to Gale and Shapley (1962) shows that the core of a 
room-mate problem may be empty. 
 
Example 1 (Gale Shapley (1962)) : Let X = {1,2,3,4}. For a∈X, let u
a: X→ℜ be 
defined as follows: 
u
1: u
1(2) = 3, u
1(3) = 2, u
1(4) = 1, u
1(1) = 0; 
u
2: u
2(3) = 3, u
2(1) = 2, u
2(4) = 1, u
2(2) = 0; 
u
3: u
3(1) = 3, u
3(2) = 2, u
3(4) = 1, u
3(3) = 0; 
u
4: u
4(1) = 3, u
4(2) = 2, u
4(3) = 1, u
4(4) = 0. 
Let, G be a CCP such that for all S∈[X]: (i)G(S) = {x∈ℜ
S/ for some µ∈C
0(S), 
x(a) = u
a(µ(a)) for all a∈S}, if #S ∈{1,2}; (ii) G(S) = φ, otherwise. 
Suppose (f,v) is an outcome such that v(4) ≠ 0. If v(4) = 1, then {3,4}∈f  and v(3) 
= 1. Thus,{2,3} blocks (f,v), since 2 can get 3 units and 3 can get 2 units in 
G({2,3}); if v(4) = 2, then {2,4}∈f and v(2) = 1. Thus, {1,2} blocks (f,v) since 1 
can get 3 units and 2 can get 2 units in G({1,2}); if v(4) = 3, then {1,4}∈f and   4
v(1) = 1. Thus, {1,3} blocks (f,v) since 3 can get 3 units and 1 can get 2 units in 
G({1,3}). Thus, v(4) ≠ 0 implies (f,v) does not belong to Core(G). Hence suppose 
v(4) = 0. If v(3) = 0, then both {2,3} and {3,4} block (f,v); if v(2) = 0, then both 
{1,2}and {2,4} block (f,v); if v(1) = 0, then both {1,3} and {1,4} block (f,v). 
Since v(4) = 0 requires v(a) = a for at least one a∈{1,2,3}, Core(G) = φ.  
Note that the outcome (f
*,v
*) such that f




*(3) = 3, v
*(4) = 0, belongs to the Core(G
*), where G
* is such that for all S∈[X]: 
(i)G*(S) = {x∈ℜ
S/ for some µ∈C
0(S), x(a) = u
a(µ(a)) for all a∈S}, if #S 
∈{1,2,3}; (ii) G*(S) =φ, otherwise. 
 
Given a CCP G and a Pareto Optimal  outcome (f,v), the pair ((f',v'), T) where 
(f',v') is an outcome for G and T∈f' is said to be a strong  objection against (f,v) if 
v'(a) > v(a) for all a ∈T and no subset of T is a blocking coalition for (f',v'). 
 
Given a CCP G, a Pareto Optimal  outcome (f,v) and a strong objection ((f',v'),T) 
against (f,v), an ordered pair ((f'',v''),U) where (f'',v'') is an outcome for G and 
U∈ f''  is said to be a strong counter-objection against ((f',v'),T) if: (a)U\T, T\U 
and U∩T are all non-empty; (b)v''(a) > v'(a) for all a∈ U.  
The strong objection ((f',v'),T) against the outcome (f,v) is said to be justified, if 
((f',v'),T) has no strong counter-objection. 
 
We define the weak bargaining set of a CCP G, to be the set WB(G) = {(f,v)/ (f,v) 
is Pareto Optimal and such that no strong objection against (f,v) is justified}. 
 
Example 1 (due to Gale and Shapley (1962)) is one that has an empty core, but a  
non-empty weak bargaining set. We saw in Example 1, that Core(G) = φ.  
However, consider v(4) = 1, v(3) = 1, v(2) = 2, v(1) = 3, f = {{1,2},{3,4}}. The 
pair ((f', v'), {2,3}) is a strong objection against (f,v), where v'(2) = 3, v'(3) = 2, 
v'(1) = v'(4) = 0 and f' = {{1},{4},{2,3}}. Let f'' = {{2}, {4}, {1,3}}, v''(1) = 2, 
v''(3) = 3, v'' (2) = v''(4) = 0.Then the pair ((f'',v''), {1,3}) is a strong counter-
objection against ((f',v'),{2,3}). Further, (f,v) admits no blocking coalition other 
than {1,3}. Since no subset of {1,3} blocks (f',v'), (f,v) belongs to WB(G). 
 
Note that it is possible to provide a definition of the weak bargaining set modified 
along the lines suggested in Mas-Colell (1989).  
 
Given a CCP G an outcome (f,v) and a strong objection ((f',v'),T) against (f,v), an 
ordered pair ((f'',v''),U) is said to be a classical strong counter-objection against 
((f',v'),T) if: (a) U∈f''; (b) U\T, U\S and U∩T are all non-empty; (c) v''(a) ≥  v(a) 
for all a∈U|T; (d) v''(a) > v'(a) for all a∈U.  
The strong objection ((f',v'),T) against the outcome (f,v) is said to be classically 
justified, if ((f',v'),T) has no classical strong counter-objection. 
We define the classical weak bargaining set of a CCP G, to be the set WB
*(G) = 
{(f,v)/ (f,v) is Pareto Optimal, and such that no strong objection against (f,v) is 
classically justified}.  
   5
However, the following example reveals that even for room-mates problems, 
WB
*(G) may be empty. 
 
Example 2: Let X = {1,2,3}. For a∈X, let u
a: X→ℜ be defined as follows: 
u
1: u
1(2) = 2, u
1(3) = 1, u
1(1) = 0; 
u
2: u
2(3) = 2, u
2(1) = 1, u
2(2) = 0; 
u
3: u
3(1) = 3, u
3(2) = 2, u
3(3) = 0. 
 
Let, G be the CCP such that for all S∈[X]: (i)G(S) = {x∈ℜ
S/ for some µ∈C
0(S), 
x(a) = u
a(µ(a)) for all a∈S}, if #S ∈{1,2}; (ii) G(S) =φ, otherwise. 
Since (f,v) such that v(a) = 0 for all a∈X is not Pareto Optimal, it cannot belong 
to WB
*(G). 
Let (f,v) be the outcome such that f = {{1,3},{2}}, v(1) = 1, v(2) = 0, v(3) = 2 and 
(f',v') be the outcome such that f' = {{1,2},{3}}, v'(1) = 2, v'(2) = 1, v'(3) = 0. 
Thus, ((f',v'), {1,2}) is a strong objection against (f,v). Any strong counter-
objection or classical strong counter-objection cannot contain agent 1, since agent 
1 gets 2 units of pay-off at (f',v'). The only possibility is (({{2,3}, {1}}, v''), 
{2,3}) where v''(1) = 0, v''(3) = 1, v''(2) = 2,which is a strong counter-objection 
though not a classical strong counter-objection, since agent 3 is worse off at 
(f'',v'') than at (f,v). Thus, (f,v) ∉WB
*(G).    
Let (f,v) be the outcome such that f = {{1},{2,3}}, v(1) = 0, v(2) = 2, v(3) = 1 and 
(f',v') be the outcome such that f' = {{1,3},{2}}, v'(1) = 1, v'(2) = 0, v'(3) = 2. 
Thus, ((f',v'), {1,3}) is a strong objection against (f,v). Any strong counter-
objection or classical strong counter-objection cannot contain agent 3, since agent 
3 gets 2 units of pay-off at (f',v'). The only possibility is (({{1,2}, {3}}, v''), 
{1,3}) where v''(1) = 2, v''(3) = 0, v''(2) = 1,which is a strong counter-objection 
though not a classical strong counter-objection, since agent 2 is worse off at 
(f'',v'') than at (f,v). Thus, (f,v) ∉WB
*(G). Thus, WB*(G) = φ.   
Hence Bar
*(G) = φ. 
 
3. The non-emptiness of the weak bargaining set: 
 
Theorem 1: Let G be a CCP. Then, WB(G) ≠ φ. 
 
Proof: Let G be a CCP and let (f,v) be a Pareto Optimal outcome for G. If (f,v) 




1) is a strong objection against (f,v) which further does not admit a strong 
counter-objection. Then, no member of S






1) is a strong objection against (f,v) which further does not 
















2) is a strong objection against (f
1,v
1) 
which further does not admit a strong counter-objection. Thus, S
2∩S
1= φ. Without 




1(a) for all a∈S
1. This is possible, 
since S
2∩S
1 = φ. Then, no member of S
1∪S
2 is part of a strong objection against 
(f
2,v
2).    6





p-1) for p = 1,…., 
k, where (f
0,v







k) there are two possibilities: there does exist a strong 
objection against (f
k,v
k) in which case (f
k,v






k). If every such strong objection admits a 
strong counter-objection, then (f
k,v




k+1), which further does not admit a strong counter-
objection. Clearly, S







for p = 1,…,k and v
k+1(a) = v
k(i) for all a∈ . Then no member of   is 













Since X is a finite set, there is a smallest positive integer K, such that either every 
objection ((f',v'), T) against (f
K,v
K) admits a strong counter-objection, or [ = 







K). In either case, 
(f
K,v
K)∈WB(G). Q.E.D.  
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